The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has proven to be far more contentious than one might have expected, given its origins. Devised in 1995 by German Finance Minister Theo Waigel in order to ensure the continued observance of strict fiscal policies after monetary union commenced, the country that originated the SGP became one of its first transgressors. Indeed, several countries have earned the Commission's ire as a result of their inability to remain under the deficit ceilings mandated by the Pact. Concern over the inability of these countries to fulfill their SGP requirements has been matched by concern over the differential treatment of these economies by their peers in the Ecofin Council; while larger states like Germany and France are able to repeatedly violate the Pact, seemingly with impunity, smaller countries like Portugal and Greece seem to be held to a higher standard and are expected to bring their economies back in line more quickly. In addition, the attitudes of the Finance Ministers in regard to the strictness of the interpretation of the Pact has also varied according to size; while larger countries like Italy (and France and Germany, not surprisingly) have advocated reform, smaller countries like Austria and the Netherlands have warned of the loss of credibility that would ensue a loosening of the Pact. This paper considers the role that country size plays in the operation of the Stability and Growth Pact, arguing that it impacts the SGP in three interrelated ways: the country's economic interest, its policy options, and the reaction of other countries to those options. The following section briefly explains the technical operation of the Pact and how it relies primarily on reputation concerns to keep participating countries in line.
The widely discussed consensus regarding the importance of tight monetary policy and by extension fiscal balance should make this process relatively straightforward: if the countries agree on the importance of these economic objectives, non-adherence to them should be a cause for concern among all the parties. In practice, however, this has not been the case, and countries have demonstrated different levels of tolerance for the Pact's stringent requirements. Numerous reforms have been suggested, but agreement has been difficult to achieve. Battle lines have been drawn largely along country size.
Country size affects a state's economic interests, its policy options, and the reactions of fellow Member States and EU institutions. Economic research demonstrates that smaller countries have less of an ability to run counter-cyclical cycles than larger countries, making the SGP more costly for the latter as it closes off policy options that are not available to its smaller counterparts. In addition, the larger size of these countries gives them more voting weight within the Council of Ministers, and therefore it is costly in the long run for smaller countries to alienate these larger states by voting against them.
The built-in influence that these countries enjoy by virtue of their larger size makes punishment by "naming and shaming" also irrelevant. Moreover, the larger countries have been leading the way in monetary integration for years, helping to create the stability culture (Germany) and the potential for the politicization of policy (France), making the SGP controversy a continuation of a battle of ideas that now have the two countries on the same side.
The final section examines the short history of the Stability and Growth Pact and how it has treated its transgressors. Larger countries like France and Germany were able to escape formal and to a large extent informal censure in a way that smaller countries like Portugal and Greece were not. Until the economic circumstances become more favorable to these larger states, they will continue to breach the SGP unless it is reformed to accommodate their interests and deal with all of the states more flexibly.
The Logic of the Stability and Growth Pact: Questioning the Strength of the Consensus The Maastricht Treaty outlined plans for monetary union by requiring would-be participants to achieve the convergence criteria in order to ensure that the Eurozone would be comprised of economies that would not threaten Germany's price stability. By the late 1980s, monetary politics in the EC followed the lead of West Germany, whose currency formed the unofficial anchor of the system. Ideas regarding the long-term tradeoff between inflation and unemployment were replaced by a consensus on the need for low inflation in order to be able to keep interest rates low, thus spurring economic growth (McNamara 1998) . The Maastricht Treaty thus demanded convergence in inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, debts and deficits for the participants, though countries could be approaching the required levels and still be admitted to EMU, so long as the other Member States agreed (as was the case for Italy and Belgium). The pursuit of economic growth through an independent central bank and fiscal policies that would limit the ability of governments to intervene in the economy reflect the neoliberal consensus that prevailed in the 1990s (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004) .
However, there were no mechanisms to ensure that the fiscal rectitude would continue once monetary union began, prompting German Finance Minister Theo Waigel to construct the Stability Pact. The Pact would also have the additional benefits of buttressing the credibility of the nascent monetary union as well as provide participants with a framework for policy coordination post-EMU (Heipertz and Verdun 2004 Germany's partners (Chang 2002) . Though the importance of controlling inflation has been emphasized repeatedly throughout the monetary union process, the issue of how EMU does (and does not) promote growth was sidelined in favor of constructing a credible institution (the European Central Bank) and system (comprised of the ECB, the Eurogroup, and Ecofin councils) that would not jeopardize the pursuit of price stability.
Therefore the Eurogroup had to settle for informal status, to the chagrin of those who had tried to make it an economic government to counterweight the independent ECB, and additional legislation was passed to ensure continued vigilance against fighting inflation.
The concern for growth later would be resurrected by France as well as its former opponent-turned-ally in the SGP reform debate, Germany, shortly after the introduction of the euro.
As described on the Europa website, 2 the SGP entails three elements: 1.) a political commitment to a budget surveillance process, with the desired effect being that Finally, a compromise was reached in which the "unification of Europe" was deemed an acceptable justification for its breach of the SGP, and Germany was allowed to offset reunification costs at 4 percent of GDP a year. In exchange, Schroeder agreed to abandon his efforts to reduce the role of the Commission in policing the Pact. Italian
Finance Minister Domenico Siniscalco remarked that the revisions seek both stability and growth (La Repubblica, 3/21/05), as the name of the SGP implies. Indeed, pension reforms will be considered when evaluating large budget deficits in excess of SGP limits, as will spending for research and development and the pursuit of policies "achieving European goals."
Which factors would be relevant varies according to each Member State, which
determines for itself what factors should be considered by the Commission and Ecofin.
This was done to resolve another bone of contention in which larger states wanted a longer list of relevant factors in the proposal, while the smaller states thought there were too many; in the end, the list itself was abandoned (euobserver.com, 3/21/2005).
In the event that a country is found to have an excessive deficit, the deadline to correct it has been extended from one year to two, and that this grace period could be In addition to the talks by policymakers on the need to reform the SGP, economists were also quick to point out its weaknesses, and some of these criticisms factored into the aforementioned policy decisions. Early reports expressed concern that the SGP would divert efforts towards more necessary economic reforms in the European labor market, for example (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998) . More recent analyses suggest that while the EDP places too much emphasis on the government's budget deficit, a greater emphasis on the sustainability of the government's public debt levels would provide a better indicator as to whether or not its budget deficit is excessive (Mortensen 2004 ), a factor that was introduced in all of the reform proposals discussed above. In addition, tight monetary and fiscal policy may be strategic substitutes for one another, with looser fiscal policy promoting tighter monetary policy and vice versa (Mélitz 1997) , possibly making the SGP less critical to EMU's success given the ideational convergence on tight monetary policy and lack of a similarly strong consensus on tight fiscal policy.
One of the most common criticisms brought about in policy circles is that the SGP is counterproductive in achieving one its nominally central tenets, that of economic growth. Economists have argued, tight monetary policy may also be counterproductive within the context of EMU because it punishes offending countries when they are likely to be facing an economic recession, thus exacerbating their problem (Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini 1993) . Many of the problems facing the countries of the EU are the result of weak economic growth and in some cases, negative growth. Economic research indicates that country size can have a strong effect on a country's economic interests, making such disputes a predictable outcome of this one-size-fits-all policy. In addition to these economic realities, political realities also deem that larger countries play a different role in the management of the SGP than smaller ones.
Country Size and Economic Interests
In a recent symposium in the Journal of Common Market Studies, authors summarized the different schools of thought in relation to how country size affects its economic interest (Buti and Pench 2004) . First, larger countries find fiscal consolidation to be more costly due to the larger impact that an increase in government expenditure has in big countries versus small countries ( Not only are larger countries less likely to suffer if they breach the Pact, they are more likely to benefit than smaller countries would. Pre-EMU, larger states either set monetary policy (Germany) or could adjust their exchange rates periodically (France and Italy); smaller states were more likely to have followed a policy of a hard peg to the DM, making the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria and the SGP less costly for them (Posen 2004) . In effect, the smaller states enjoyed less autonomy due to their size, so the restrictions of the SGP are less constraining than for large states, which would try to offset their loss of monetary autonomy with more flexible fiscal policy.
Politics and ideas surrounding the importance of European unification guided Germany towards surrendering its currency, rather than strong expectations of economic benefits (Baun 1996; Dyson and Featherstone 1999) . For the small states, the choice for monetary union was more obvious, as they would benefit from the lower interest rates and greater credibility that monetary union could provide without paying the cost in the loss of monetary sovereignty, something they had already abandoned during their years in the European Monetary System. Therefore, damaging that credibility by engaging in fiscal behavior that could weaken the SGP held greater costs for smaller states.
Much concern had been expressed regarding the wisdom of imposing a single interest rate on an region that had not yet achieved the criteria advised by optimum currency level theorists (Dibooglu and Horvath 1997; Eichengreen 1992; Mundell 1961) .
Though the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria were clear in regard to establishing clear thresholds and goals that countries needed to achieve in order to make EMU a success, it was not inflexible, owing to the political exigencies of trying to allow as many Member States as possible to join EMU (albeit to the annoyance of some states, such as the Netherlands, which would have preferred a stricter interpretation of the convergence criteria). Though the EMU states may be moving towards an optimum currency area as a result of monetary integration and the expected increase in trade (Frankel and Rose 1998) , the component Member States still do not have the same economic experience that makes one policy optimal for all states. Potentially fiscal policy could alleviate some of the tensions that this situation gives rise to, but the potential for moral hazard and the inflationary consequences of the bailout of profligate governments made the SGP an important component of buttressing the credibility of EMU.
However, some have argued that the SGP does not constrain fiscal policy as much as economist, policymakers and the media have argued. Empirical tests demonstrate that discretionary budget deficits have become even more countercyclical since EMU began a trend present in non-EMU countries as well (Gali and Perotti 2003) .
The controversy over the SGP can be viewed in some ways as a continuation of the debate on the wisdom of monetary integration among still disparate economies with different economic incentives. The basis of many of these differences depends on country size.
Country Size and Policy Options
As the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War explained, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. This explanation of international relations has informed many analyses, especially those subscribing to realist principles.
International organizations like the European Union attempted to rise above the nationstate in order to foster more peace and cooperation through interstate treaties as well as the development of supranational forms of governance that would upgrade the common interest and provide Member States with long-term benefits despite having to pay costs in the short-run. A long-running debate among EU scholars focuses on the relative importance of nation states versus supranational institutions and transnational actors (some prominent examples include (Haas 1957; Hoffmann 1966; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989) . More recently, some theorists have tried to bridge this gap between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism with frameworks of analysis that incorporate both sets of actors and ascribe them with important powers and functions which vary by issue area and level of governance (Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Pollack 1997 ).
In reference to European monetary union in particular, nation states, especially Germany (Chang 2002; Heisenberg 1998; Kaltenthaler 2002; Loedel 1999; Moravcsik 1998) , and ideas (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; McNamara 1998; Verdun 1999 ) have been the primary explanatory variables for the timing, pace and content of monetary integration. Though economic, ideational and organizational factors play a role, all of the aforementioned theories to varying degrees have given Germany pride of place in explaining why EMU occurred and why it looks the way that it does. Historically the long-term success of monetary union has depended on either the presence of a dominant state that can maintain order within the region, or a broad network of institutional linkages across nation states that make reduced national autonomy acceptable to participants (Cohen 1994) . EMU has made use of both mechanisms, but German consent, as the anchor of the European Monetary System, was necessary for a viable monetary union. As the holder of the unofficial leading currency of the EMS, Germany had the most to lose by changing the status quo and giving up its stable and credible currency for one forged with its European partners. Germany agreed to monetary union due to their desire to integrate Germany further with Europe prior to unification in order to assuage remaining doubts and fears about its geopolitical aspirations (Kaltenthaler 2002) . Given its importance to EMU due to its size and its leading role in the existing arrangement for monetary cooperation, Germany could frame much of the debate and institutionalize its preferences in the form of the ECB's independence, the Maastricht convergence criteria and the SGP, in addition to preventing an economic government from forming as a counterweight to the ECB. Another policy option would be for alliances across institutions. For example, the ECB could punish the Member States should SGP rules become too lax by raising interest rates; however, if these fiscal decisions do not affect inflation, the ECB would be reluctant to use this option (Howarth and Loedel 2004) The efficacy of linking up with the ECB in order to alter monetary policy is questionable, however. Much of the influence of its predecessor, the Bundesbank, rest not with its official position but with its reputation, record of success, and the perception that is possessed superior ideas and information in regard to monetary policymaking that enabled it to form relationships with other influential actors, including the financial community (Bernhard 1998; Goodman 1992; Heisenberg 1998; Kaelberer 2003; McNamara 1998) . The ECB does not have the same track record or comparable influence in regard to its ideas.
Monetary integration already has seen its share of ups and downs prior to the SGP controversy; in 1993 after widening the exchange rate bands to accommodate the increase in currency speculation, there was concern that this meant the end of EMU's credibility.
Some also decried admitting states that had not met all of the convergence criteria to EMU, fearing the loss of credibility before monetary union had even begun. But the Member States forged on and shifted the debate away from this setback and looked forward to the future and how to make monetary union a viable reality. France and Germany, the traditional leaders and proponents of monetary integration, are in the best position to shift the debate once more. Though currently met with skepticism regarding the political motivations behind their ideas, their ideas have found advocates among at least some of the other Member States, and it could be the first step in altering expectations in a way that does not sacrifice monetary union for the sake of satisfying domestic political demands. This will depend on the reaction of other Member States as well as financial market actors to the Franco-German initiatives to loosen the SGP.
Country Size and Reactions
The reaction of Member States to a government's proposal is crucial because of the preference for operating on consensus. While the SGP allows for punitive measures in the event of noncompliance, its brief history demonstrates how difficult it is to make use of these measures. Indeed, particularly in light of the March 2005 reforms, the French government compared the SGP to "nuclear dissuasion" (Le Figaro, 3/23/2005) .
The most powerful sanction under a system of policy coordination is the public embarrassment of "naming and shaming" recalcitrant members (Meyer 2004) . The efficacy of such a procedure will also vary according to country size, as larger Member
States will find less damage done to its reputation and its influence in the EU than a smaller state would, giving it more policy options.
Prior to the Ecofin meeting, the Eurogroup finance ministers discuss important issues amongst themselves, in part to share information but also to forge a common ground prior to the more inclusive Ecofin meetings. They have been successful at times at influencing Member State behavior, even among larger states. The Eurogroup successfully dissuaded French Finance Minister Mer from making further defiant comments in regard to France's adherence to the Pact in 2002; indeed, Mer went from stating that France had priorities other than the SGP to reiterating its importance (Puetter 2004 ). However, the consensus forged among the Eurozone countries apparently has its limits as it has continually been tested since then as larger states strive to incorporate more flexibility into the system that smaller states prefer to retain as is. Nevertheless, it is not in the interest of any of the participants to give the impression of a bully; German press accounts of the March 2005 Eurogroup meeting report that Eichel clearly avoided the impression that Germany succeeded through brute force against the Pact's hardliners (Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, 3/22/2005) . Instead he chose to emphasize, "There were no winners and losers" (FT Deutschland, 3/22/2005) .
The preference for consensus and the decision-making procedure of the SGP may be a problem in and of itself. In December 1996, Otmar Issing, then Chief Economist of Bundesbank, criticized the SGP for allowing the "fiscal sinners" to be part of the negotiating process and be allowed to judge other states in need of reprimand for fiscal profligacy (Financial Times, 12/17/1996) . Not surprisingly, the ECB was very critical of the reform package agreed upon by the finance ministers in March 2005. The ECB issued a statement expressing its concern that budgetary discipline could be destabilized by the new Pact and hinted that it might have to hike up interest rates to counteract its effect (Financial Times, 3/21/2005) . While German Finance Minister Hans Eichel made assurances that the new Pact was not "a license to create debt," but rather allows for the consideration of "individual cases," Juncker promised that it "would affect neither the culture nor practice of stability" (FT Deutschland, 3/21/2005) . Such avowals did little to assuage the concerns of the ECB, but thus far it has not followed through on threats to raise interest rates (Howarth and Loedel 2004) .
Other institutions like the Commission and the Court recognized the danger that the actions taken by the larger states posed not only for the SGP but also for their own authority. This is why the Commission took the Council to Court, not only was it protecting the integrity of the Pact, it was also looking out for its institutional prerogative as watchdog of the SGP. Though there had been speculation in the press that the Court would have little incentive to take action against the two most powerful members of the EU, the Court's ruling was largely in favor of the Commission.
Financial markets would be the most significant arbiters of the SGP, as increased speculation or the selling off of euro-denominated assets would be the proximate cause of such interest rate hikes by the ECB. Various financial market participants were interviewed in the press after the March 2005 reform package was passed, and they delivered quotes expressing disappointment with the results. Overall, however, both the ECB and financial market actors will most likely look at the results of the Eurozone and the extent to which the reform has been a precursor to increased deficits. If this were the case, larger deficits on the part of larger countries would affect the Eurozone more than its smaller counterparts. In addition, as the leading figures in monetary integration, French and German actors set the tone for the rest of the area. But the proceedings against France and Germany were not met with a strong reaction from financial markets, so it remains to be seen if they will respond to this latest political development or continue to keep a watchful eye on how the respective economies of the participating countries progress. The flexibility of allowing states like Belgium and Italy before they met the convergence criteria did not do serious damage to the introduction of the euro. Similarly, the ruckus caused by the relatively loose application of the SGP's mechanisms for punishment are unlikely to be the cause of the euro's demise or the downfall of EMU.
